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EUACCESSION TO THE ECHR
INTRODUCTION
The issues raised by EU Accession to the ECHR have
already generated a valuable and growing literature.' This article
seeks to contribute to this literature. The discussion begins with
an overview of the European Union's competence to accede to
the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), and the
process by which the Accession Agreement was negotiated. The
focus then shifts to analysis of whether the EU needs its own
Charter of Rights2 in addition to membership of the ECHR.
This is followed by examination of a range of procedural
issues raised by EU accession to the ECHR. This includes the
choices open to claimants when pursuing rights-based claims
and the constraints placed on those choices resulting from EU
accession to the ECHR. It will be seen that accession raises some
difficult issues concerning who should be the respondent and
co-respondent in any particular case, and the manner in which a
case concerning Convention rights is routed to the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") based in Strasbourg. The
new schema will moreover generate problems of delay.
The final section of the article addresses some of the
prominent substantive issue raised by EU accession to the
ECHR. This includes a re-assessment of the case law defining the
relationship between the EU and the ECHR prior to accession
and evaluation of the extent to which it is relevant post
accession; discussion of the impact of accession on the
autonomy of EU law; and consideration of the way in which the
ECHR rights and Charter rights will interact in the future.
1. See generally Christina Eckes, EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and
Adaptation, 76 MODERN L.RFV. 254 (2013); Jean-Paul jacque, The Accession of the
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
48 COMMON MKT L. FV. 99 (2011); Tobias Lock, EU Accession to the ECHR:
nplications fr Judicial Reiew in Strasbourg, 35 EUR. I. REV. 777 (2010); Tobias Lock,
Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU
Legal Order, 48 COIMON MKT. L. REV. 1025 (2011); Tobias Lock, End of an Epic? The
Draft Agreement on the EU's Accession to the ECHR, 31 YLARBOOK OF EUROPLAN L. 162
(2012); Noreen O'Meara, A More Secuie Europe of Rights?' The Euiopean Court ofHuman
Rights, the Court ofJ ustice of the European Unio and EUAcceion to theECHR, 12 GERMAN
L.J. 1813 (2011).
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 0.J. C 83/389
[hereinafter Charter of Rights].
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It is a great pleasure to contribute to this symposium for Sir
Konrad Schiemann, to honor his work both in the UK Court of
Appeal and as the UKjudge on the European Court ofJustice.
I. COMPETENCE
A. Competence and Process
Debate about the relationship between the EU and the
ECHR is, asJacqu6 rightly notes,' as old as the Community itself.
The nature of this debate has been told ably elsewhere,
including byJacque himself. Suffice it to say for the present that
prior to the Lisbon Treaty the ECtHR jurisprudence was the
most formative influence on the European Court of Justice's
(ECJ) own fundamental rights' case law,4 but the EU was not
formally bound by the ECHR, and there were doubts over its
competence to accede.5
The Lisbon Treaty formally resolved the status of the EU's
Charter of Rights by rendering it legally binding with the same
legal status as the constituent treaties.6 The Lisbon Treaty also
stipulated that the EU should accede to the ECHR,7 albeit with
the caveat that such accession should not affect the Union's
competences as defined in the Treaty on European Union
("TEU") and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU"). There is a Protocol attached to the Lisbon Treaty,
which states that the agreement relating to accession to the
ECHR must make provision for preserving the specific
characteristics of the Union and Union law.8 This is in particular
3. Seejacqu6, supra note 1, at 995.
4. See Guy Harpaz, The European Court ofJustice a7d its Reltions with the European
Court of Human Rights: the Quest for Enhanced Reliance, Coherence and Legitimacy. 46
COMMON MKT L. RLV. 105, 108 (2009).
5. See Opinion 2/94, On Accesion by the Community he European Convention fir the
Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedomns [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759.
6. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(1), 2012 0.
C 326/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU].
7. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6, art. 6(2).
8. Id. art. 6(2); Protocol (No. 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on
European Union on the Accession of the Union to the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundaneintal Frecdoins, 2012 0J. C 326/273
[hereinafter Protocol No. 8].
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with regard to the arrangements for the Union's participation in
the control bodies of the ECHR, and the mechanisms necessary
to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual
applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or
the Union as appropriate.9
Although the Lisbon Treaty contained no timeline for
accession to the ECHR, it did impose a duty to accede.
Negotiations began in July 2010 and were carried forward by a
committee composed of representatives from the ECHR and the
EU.) The committee reached an agreement in July 2011, which
had to be approved by the appropriate decision-making organ
within the EU and ECHR respectively." Some Member States of
the EU were unhappy with certain aspects of the July Agreement
and proposed changes, but these changes were not accepted by
all Member States of the EU. An ad hoc working group named
the 47+1 group was established by the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe to broker agreement on the issues where
disagreement persists. 2  The working group reached
agreement' on the draft text in April 2013.1
9. The Protocol also seeks to preserve derogations made by Member States
pursuant to Artidce 15 of the ECHR and reservations made by Member States in
relation to their membership of the ECHR. See Protocol No. 8, supra note 8, art 2.
10. See EU Accession to the Convention of Human Rights. COUNCIL OF EU ROPE,
http:/hub.Coe.int /web/ coe-poital /what-we -do/human-rights/ cu -accession- to- the-
convention. The working documents on the accession of the European Union to the
Convention can be found at http://www.co.inLt/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/
Accession/Working _documents cn.asp.
11. See Draft Legal Instruments on the Accession of the European Union to the
European Convention on Human Rights, (DDH-UE (2011) 16 (draft) [hereinafter
Draft Legal Instruments]. available at http://www.coc.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
hrpolicy7/Accession/Working docuiients/CDDH-UE_201 1_16_linalen.pdf.
12. See Council of Europe, Relevant Excerpts from the Report of the 75th Meeting
of the CDDH, 1[ 9, (2012), available at http://www.coc.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
hrpolic/accession/Workingdocuiments/47_1 %282012%2902_Extracts_(l)I)H
RcportEN.pdf.
13. Steering Committee for Human Rights, Fifth Negotiation Meeting BetwcCn
the CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on Accession of
the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (2013)
[hereinafter Fifth Negotiation Meeting], available at http://ww..coc.int/t/dghl/
standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/ Workingd(octuIent scn.asp .
14. See iilestone reached in EU Accession to ECHR, COUNCIL OF' ELROPE, available at
http://hub.coe.int/web/coe-portal/what-wve-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-
convention (last visited July 4, 2013).
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Article 6(2) TEU imposed an obligation on the EU to
accede to the ECHR, but was silent concerning accession to
ECHR Protocolsi 5 The Council decided to negotiate accession
only in relation to Protocols that all Member States of the EU
had already accepted. This could, as Jacqu6 rightly notes, I be
problematic because Article 52(3) of the Charter imposes an
obligation to read Charter rights that correspond to Convention
rights in the same way as those Convention rights. 7 A claimant
might therefore rely on Article 52(3) in circumstances where
Charter rights correspond to those in the Convention, but
where the relevant Charter rights are contained in a Protocol to
the Convention that was not included in the Accession
Agreement.
The final version of the accession agreement must in any
event be accepted unanimously by the Council and requires the
consent of the European Parliament. It must then be approved
by the Member States in accord with their respective
constitutional requirements." The ECJ's approval of the
agreement will also be sought. The accession agreement must
also be accepted in accord with the requirements of the ECHR.
There is nonetheless a great deal in the July Agreement that is
agreed by both sides and therefore the important contours of
the ECHR/EU deal are clear. The ECHR will be used principally
by claimants in order to challenge EU legal acts that are said to
violate Convention rights, but these rights might also be used to
challenge primary provisions of the constituent EU Treaties.'
B. Competence and Need
The discourse concerning EU Accession to the ECHR has
been coloured implicitly if not explicitly by the assumption that
things would be simpler for the states that are party to both the
15. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6, art. 6(2), 2012 O.J. C 326/13.
16. Seejacque, supra note 1, at 1004-05.
17. See id. at 1004-05. This is subject to the caveat that the EU can provide nore
extensive protection.
18. SeeTFU, supra note 6, art. 218, 1 8, 2012 (.). C 326/ 146.
19. This is the assumption underlying the Draft Legal Instruments on the
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights. See
Draft Legal Instruments, supra note 11, art. 3, 1 3.
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EU and the ECHR if the EU did not have a separate rights-based
nstrument in the form of the EU Charter of Rights.
There are however real difficulties with this argument. The
EU is a polity that comprises twenty-eight Member States,"0 with
in excess of 500 million people.21 The German Federal
Constitutional Court was correct a generation ago to pressure
the EEC to develop a fundamental rights case law,"2 and it would
almost certainly have done so even if it had not been pressed
into action by the FCC.23 The ECJ recognized that the Treaty
and measures made pursuant thereto could impact on
fundamental rights, and that protection for those rights at EEC
level would enhance the legitimacy of the Community, as well as
head off threat of revolt by the Member States. It was then
natural for the EU to take this case law and develop it into a
more visible human rights document that became the EU
Charter of Rights. The imperatives that have driven Member
States to articulate written Bills of Rights were equally applicable
to the EU. These imperatives were evident in the deliberations
of the Cologne European Council in 1999,24 which decided that
there should be a Charter of Fundamental Rights to consolidate
the fundamental rights applicable at Union Level and to make
their overriding importance more visible to EU citizens.25
This might be accepted, but some nonetheless argue that
matters would have been much simpler/better if the EU,
desirous of a Bill of Rights, had simply joined the ECHR, as it is
now doing post the Lisbon Treaty. It can be accepted that there
20. See Countries, European Union, http://curopa.cu/about-cu/countries (last
visitedJuly 4, 2013).
21. See Living in the EU EUROPEAN UNION, http://curopa.cu/about-cu/facts-
figures/living (last visited july 4, 2013).
22. See generally Internationale Handclsgcscllschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstclic
finr Getreide und Futtcrnittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1-1125 (Geriman
Constitutional Court pressuring the EEC to develop a fundamental rights case law)
23. See Grainne de Burca, The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law, in THE
EVOLUTION oF EU LAw 465, 477-79 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Birca eds., 2d cd. 2011).
24. See Cologne European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Annexes
(1999).
25. See generally Paolo Carozza, The Menber States, in THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: POLITICS, LAw & POLICY 40 (Stve Peers & Angcla Ward eds.,
2004); Grainne de Birca, The Drafting of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 26
EUROPEAN L. RLV. 126, 130 (2001); Justus Sch6nlau. DRAFTING THE EU CHARTER:
RIlHT.TIivITIMACYVAND PROnCES80-R1 (200(
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are good normative reasons as to why the EU should be
monitored in terms of human rights, in the same way that it
demands of others. This is, however, a different point. The
justification for the EU having a separate Charter is quite simply
that the EU, like any other polity, is perfectly entitled to judge
for itself which rights should be included within any Bill or
Charter of Rights. It made this determination in Tampere and
Cologne in 1999 in opting for a document that would contain a
broader set of rights than those in the ECHR.26 There will
inevitably be some who agree with this choice, others who do
not, but the decision as to the breadth of the Charter was for the
constituent powers of the EU to make, and they made it after
due deliberation. It necessarily follows that even after EU
accession the Strasbourg Court will only have the final say in
relation to those Charter rights that are also contained in the
Convention. The ECJ will retain final authority in relation to
other Charter rights.
II. PROCEDURE
A. Choice and Consequence for Claimants
Litigants who wish to advance a rights-based argument have
a number of options at their disposal. EU accession to the ECHR
has added a further variable to the factors that the applicant
should take into account. This can be exemplified by reference
to the UK. Different situations should be disaggregated for the
sake of clarity.
First, if there is no connection to EU law then the applicant
will perforce have to use the Human Rights Act 1998 and access
the ECHR through this route.2 The precepts concerning
fundamental rights' from EU law can only be used against
Member State action where it falls within the scope of EU law.
The application of this precept can be contentious given the
breadth of EU law, but this does not undermine the force of the
26. See Cologne European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Annexes
(1999); Tampere European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency (1999), available at
http:,/ww.cuiroparl.cuiropa.cu/sunuinits/tarnei.htmn#d.
27. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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precept itself. 8 This has been confirmed by the EU Charter of
Rights, Article 51(1) of which provides that Member States are
only bound when implementing EU law", the better
interpretation of this provision being that they are bound when
acting within the scope of EU law.so The limit of EU competence
is reinforced by Article 51(2) of the Charter, which states that
the Charter does not extend the field of application of EU law
beyond the powers of the Union, or establish any new power or
task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the
Treaties.31
Secondly, if there is a connection to EU law there may be
cases where the individual seeks to rely on a right contained in
the EU Charter that is not included in the ECHR or the HRA. In
such instances, it will be for the claimant to invoke the Charter
right via a direct action under Article 263 TFEU if the case is
against an EU institution.32 The claimant might alternatively
invoke the Charter right in an indirect action under Article 267
TFEU for a preliminary ruling begun in the national court in
order to challenge state action that falls within the scope of EU
law, or to attack indirectly an EU measure that cannot be
challenged directly under Article 263 TFEU because of the
restrictive rules on standing. 3
Thirdly, if there is a legal connection with EU law and the
right invoked falls within the ambit of the ECHR then the
claimant has an incentive to access the ECHR through EU law.
This was so even prior to EU accession to the ECHR. The ECJ
took account of the ECHR in fashioning its own fundamental
rights doctrine, and this then bound Member States when they
acted in the scope of EU law." Convention rights mediated
28. See generally Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Commune di Guidonia and Presidente
Regione Lazio, Case C-309/96. [1997] E.C.R. I-7493 (providing examplc of
contentiousness of given precept); Kremzow v. Austria, Case C-299/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-
2629 (same); Maurin, Case C-144/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2909 (sain).
29. See Charter of Rights art. 51(1), 2010 0.J. C 83/389.
30. Paul Craig, THE LISBON TREATY, LAwX, POLITICS & TREATY CHANGE 210-13
(2010).
31. See Charter of Rights art. 51(2), 2010 0.J. C 83/389.
32. See TFE U, supra note 6, art. 263.
33. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 267.
34. See, e.g., Elliniki Radiophonia Tikorassi AE v. Dimotki Etairia Pliroforissis and
Sotirios Kouvelas, Case C-260/89 [1991] E.C.R. I-2925; johnston v. Chief Constable of
36] 1121
1122 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL[Vol. 2013:1114
through EU law could provide a more potent weapon than the
HRA where the incompatibility with Convention rights flowed
from primary legislation. In such instances the courts are limited
to making a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA.
However, the supremacy of EU law applies in relation primary
legislation. The national courts can then declare the primary
legislation to be inapplicable to the instant case, rather than
simply making a declaration of incompatibility under section 4
HRA.",
B. Constraints on Claimant Choice: Determination of the Respondent
Litigants commonly choose the party or parties against
which to bring the claim. This choice is however circumscribed
in relation to EU accession to the ECHR. There may be
situations where it is uncertain whether the appropriate
respondent should be the Member State, or whether the EU
should also be joined as a party. This issue may arise where, for
example, the immediate target of the litigation is action taken by
a state, but where on closer examination the challenge
implicates ELU law. The Draft Accession Agreement between the
EU and the ECHR is designed to meet this problem. Article 36
ECHR is amended to accommodate the schema in Article 3 of
the Accession Agreement.
Article 3(2) provides that where an application is directed
against one or more Member States of the EU, the EU can
become a co-respondent to the proceedings where the
claimant's allegation appears to call into question the
compatibility with Convention rights of a provision of EU law,
notably where the violation could have been avoided only by
disregarding an obligation under EU law. @ Article 3(3) of the
Accession Agreement provides that where the application is
made initially against the ELU, Member States may become co-
respondent if it appears that the allegation calls into question
the compatibility with Convention rights of a provision of the
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84 [1986] E.C.R. 1651: Wachautf v. Germany,
Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609.
35. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No 2) [1991]
1 A.C. 603: Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment [1994] 1 W.L.R. 409.
36. See Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13, art. 3, 2.
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TEU, TFEU, or any other provision having the same legal value,
such as the EU Charter, especially where the violation could
have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under
those instruments.
Article 3(4) complements the previous provisions by
providing that where an application is directed against and
notified to both the EU and one or more of Member States, the
status of any respondent may be changed to that of a co-
respondent if the conditions in Aiticle 3(2)-(3) are met.3
There are, however, preconditions to the use of the co-
respondent mechanisms adumbrated above. These are laid
down in Article 3(5), which states that a High Contracting Party
shall become co-respondent either by accepting an invitation
from the Court or by decision of the Court upon the request of
that High Contracting Party. HWhen inviting a High Contracting
Party to become co-respondent, and when deciding upon a
request to that effect, the Court must seek the views of all parties
to the proceedings. When deciding upon such a request, the
Court must assess whether, in the light of the reasons given by
the High Contracting Party concerned, it is plausible that the
conditions in Article 3(2) or Article 3(3) are met.39
Article 3(7) deals with responsibility for the violation. The
Draft Agreement of July 2011 had merely stated that the
respondent and co-respondent should appear jointly before the
Strasbourg Court. This was amended to provide that the
respondent and co-respondent shall be jointly responsible for a
proven violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons
given by the respondent and the co-respondent, and having
sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them
be held responsible. 40
37. See id. art. 3. 3.
38. See id. art. 3. 4.
39. See id. art. 3. 5.
40. See Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13.
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C. Constraints on Claimant Choice: The Routing of a Case to the
Strasboug Court
EU accession to the ECHR also has implications for the way
in which cases advance from a national court to Strasbourg. We
are accustomed to a litigant raising points under the Human
Rights Act 1998, exhausting national judicial remedies before
national courts in accord with well-established case law and then
taking the case to Strasbourg thereafter if dissatisfied with the
decision at national level. Matters are more complex in relation
to cases where the claimant seeks to invoke the ECHR against
the EU.
The rationale for this complexity became evident from two
papers produced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).41 These were in
effect a form of negotiation between the two legal orders that
went on in parallel to the deliberations between the negotiating
teams from the EU and ECHR. It is clear from these papers that
the ECJ's principal concern was that it should have the
opportunity to pass judgment on an alleged violation of the
ECHR before the case was deliberated by the Strasbourg Court.
Thus the Discussion document from 2010 was predicated
on the assumption that adherence to subsidiarity as a principle
governing the relations between the ECHR and its contracting
parties meant that external review by the Strasbourg Court was
preceded by effective internal review by the ECJ and/or national
courts. This was, said the Discussion document, especially
important given that in the EU judicial system the ECJ and
General Court (GC) have the sole jurisdiction to declare an EU
act invalid. A national court could find an EU act challenged
before it to be valid, but could not find the act to be invalid
41. Discussion of the Court of Justice of the European Union on Certain Aspects
of the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2010 [hereinafter Discussion
Document of the Court of Justicel, available at http://curia.curopa.cu/ jcins/upload/
docs/application/pdl/2010-05/convention en.pdf ; President of the European Court
of Human Rights Jean-Paul Costa and the President of the European Court of Justice
Vassilios Skouris Communication to Member States. 2011 0.J. 075 [hereinafter Joint
Comnunicationil
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prior to the ECJ or GC having ruled to that effect.42 It was
therefore necessary to preserve this characteristic of the EU's
legal system of judicial protection, and this meant avoiding the
possibility that the Strasbourg Court would be called on to
decide on the conformity of an EU act with the Convention
without the ECJ having had an opportunity to give a definitive
ruling on the point.
The root cause of the problem in this respect is that EU acts
may be challenged either directly via Article 263 TFEU, or
indirectly via Article 267 TFEU by way of an application for a
preliminary ruling that the challenged measure was invalid.
Many claimants in the past have been forced to proceed
indirectly via national courts because of the very limited rules for
locus standi for a direct actioni'3 It is however difficult to regard
the application for a preliminary reference under Article 267
TFEU as a remedy since the claimant is not in control as to
whether the case proceeds, this being a determination made by
the national court. The Discussion paper concluded that it
"would be difficult to regard this procedure as a remedy which
must be made use of as a necessary preliminary to bringing a
case before the European Court of Human Rights in accordance
with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies." 44
These concerns were echoed in the subsequent Joint
Communication. In the case of a direct action review by the
Strasbourg Court would be preceded by scrutiny before an EU
court, since the action would initially proceed via Article 263
TFEU, the GC would have considered the claim and hence the
claimant would thereby have exhausted domestic remedies
before proceeding to the Strasbourg Court. here however the
action was indirect via Article 267 TFEU the national court
might not refer the case to the ECJ, the claimant might then
proceed to the Strasbourg Court before an EU court had
considered the matter and it would be difficult to deny such
recourse on the ground that the claimant had not exhausted
national remedies since the Article 267 TFEU action could not
42. Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollant Lubeck-Ost. Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199,
[ 17.
43. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 263.
44. Discussion docunent of the Court of justice, supra note 41, 10.
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be regarded as a remedy for these purposes, given that the
claimant had no power to require that such a reference should
be made.4
The concern about ensuring that the ECJ should be seized
of the issue prior to the determination being made by the
Strasbourg Court was addressed in Article 3(6) of the Draft
Agreement:
In proceedings to which the European Union is co-
respondent, if the Court of Justice of the European Union
has not yet assessed the compatibility with the Convention
rights at issue of the provision of European Union law as
under paragraph 2 of this Article, sufficient time shall be
afforded for the Court of Justice of the European Union to
make such an assessment, and thereafter for the parties to
make observations to the Court. The European Union shall
ensure that such assessment is made quickly so that the
proceedings before the Court are not unduly delayed. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the powers of
the Court.4"
It should be noted that Article 3(6) is mandatory in a triple
sense: the CJEU shall be afforded the opportunity to adjudicate
on the matter if it has not yet done so; the CJEU shall ensure
that any such assessment is made quickly, the assumption being
that the CJEU will use the accelerated procedure for such cases;
and the powers of Strasbourg Court shall not be affected.47
While Article 3(6) is clearly mandatory in the preceding
senses, it nonetheless remains ambiguous as to when the "pause
button" is pushed in Strasbourg. It must clearly be before the
ECtHR gives final judgment. It may however make a very real
difference as to whether the CJEU is afforded its opportunity
prior to the ECtHR making any determination on the merits, or
whether the ECtHR will make a prima facie determination, but
pause before making this final in the light of the CJEU's
45. See Joint Communication, supra note 41. at 2: see also Fifth Negotiation
Meeting, supra note 13, 1 65(stating with reference to art. 267 proceedings: "Since the
parties to the proceedings before the national courts may only Suggest such a
reference, this procedure cannot be considered as a legal remedy that an applicant
muLsLt exhaust before making an application to the Court.")
46. Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13, art. 3. 16.
47. See Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13, art. 3, 1 6.
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decision and observations thereon from the parties. The
explanatory report attached to the Draft Agreement states that
assessing the compatibility with the Convention means to rule
on the validity of a legal provision contained in acts of the EU
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, or on the interpretation
of a provision of the TEU, the TFEU or of any other provision
having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments, and
that such assessment should take place before the Court decides
on the merits of the application,4 However the same
explanatory report also provides that the examination of the
merits of the application by the Court should not resume before
the parties and any third party interveners have had the
opportunity to assess properly the consequences of the ruling of
the CJEU.4 It is also assumed that the parties involved will have
the opportunity to make observations before the CJEU.5o
It can be questioned whether Article 3(6) is warranted. It
will lead to further delay in proceedings. It places the EU legal
order in a privileged position, since there is no analogous
mechanism for the highest courts of other contracting parties to
the Convention. This is noteworthy given that the situation
where the CJEU has not made a pronouncement as to
compatibility with fundamental rights is not unique, given that
some national legal systems do not have any, or only very
limited, judicial review of the constitutionality of their
legislation ' with the result that Strasbourg is sometimes the first
court to rule on the compatibility of the legislation with human
rights.
It is in any event important to appreciate in more detail the
circumstances in which Article 3(6) might be invoked. It was
included, as we have seen, to cope with difficulties arising from
indirect actions under Aiticle 267 TFEU.
48. See Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13, Appendix V 1 66.
49. See id. 1 69 (emphasis added).
50. Id. 1 66.
51. See, e.g., Constitution and Charter GOVT. OF THE NETHERLANDS.
http:,//vw.gov ernnent.nI /isues/constitution-and-denocracy/constitiition-and-
charter (last visited July 4, 2013) ("The courts cannot review prinary kgislation to see
whether it is compatible with the Constitution and then declare it unlawful if it is
not.").
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There will be no difficulty where the national court believes
that the claimant's argument is prima facie correct and that the
EU measure is indeed contrary to Convention rights. The
national court cannot invalidate the EU norm. It will therefore
refer the case to the CJEU and the latter will then have the
opportunity to pronounce on the compatibility of the EU norm
with Convention rights prior to the case being heard by
Strasbourg.
There will equally be no difficulty where the claimant
argues that the national measure implementing the EU norm is
incompatible with Convention rights. The claimant contends
that the EU norm itself is compatible with ECHR rights, but that
the way in which it was implemented at national level was
contrary to Convention rights. The claimant seeks the CJEU's
view on this issue. This poses no problem viewed from the
perspective of the CJEU's concern that it has the opportunity of
considering rights-based claims prior to any adjudication by the
ECtHR. This is because the national court might refer the
matter to the CJEU, in which case the CJEU has by definition
the opportunity to pass judgment. The alternative is for the
national court to find that the claim is a good one and strike
down the implementing measure without touching the EU
norm, in which case once again this is not problematic from the
CJEU's perspective because it leaves the EU norm itself
untouched.
The problematic scenario is where the claimant challenges
the EU norm in Article 267 TFEU proceedings as being contrary
to Convention rights. The national court finds the claimant's
argument unconvincing, and upholds the validity of the EU
norm as it is entitled to do pursuant to Foto-Fost.5 Thus no case
ever goes to the CJEU to test the claimant's argument. The
claimant then seeks to contest the national court's judgment
before the ECtHR. This is the scenario that concerns the CJEU,
since it is in these circumstances that it would have no
opportunity to consider the case prior to the matter being
addressed by the ECtHR. The only way to avoid this would be to
modify Foto-Frost, such that any national court would be obliged
52. See Foto-Frost, [1987] E.C.R. 4199 1[14.
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to refer any case to the CJEU in which a claimant contested an
EU norm on Convention grounds, even where the national
court found the argument unconvincing. However it is not clear
that this modification would fit with the TFEU, since it would
impose an obligation to refer on any national court, and this is
inconsistent with the wording of Article 267 TFEU. It would also
risk overburdening the CJEU, since the national court would be
obliged to refer a case to the CJEU whenever a Convention right
was pleaded, even if the national court felt that the rights-based
argument was spurious.
There is a further scenario that is problematic from the
CJEU's perspective. The claimant once again wishes to challenge
indirectly the EU norm for violation of Convention rights. The
difference here is that the claimant seeks to take the case
directly to the Strasbourg Court without recourse to the national
court, since this will save time, costs etc. The obvious procedural
objection is that the claimant's application would be dismissed
for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The counter-argument
is, as we have seen, that Article 267 does not constitute for these
purposes a domestic remedy and hence there is no obligation to
exhaust this avenue for relief. The reason why the Ai ticle 267
procedure does not constitute a remedy for the purposes of the
rule about exhaustion of domestic remedies is itself interesting
and reveals a duality in the very meaning of remedy: it seems to
be in part because the claimant is not in control of such
proceedings, it being for the national court to decide whether to
refer, and it is in part because the national court is prevented
pursuant to Foto-Frost from invalidating the EU norm.
The preceding discussion has been concerned with the
circumstances in which Aiticle 3(6) would be invoked in
relation to indirect actions. The two papers from the
CJEU/ECtHR are expressly predicated on the assumption that
there would be no such problem in relation to direct actions,
and this view is echoed in some of the secondary literature.
The rationale for this view is that by definition such cases would
be lodged with the GC in accord with Aiticle 263 TFEU, and
hence there would be adjudication by an EU court on
53. See, e.g.,Jacqu6, supra note 1, at 1017-18.
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compatibility with Convention rights prior to any adjudication
by the ECtHR. 4
This is indeed true, subject to the following important
caveat, which is the problem with standing. If the GC or CJEU
reject a direct action, as they have often done in the past,
because there is no locus standi, then there will have been no
determination by an EU court of the Convention right before
the claimant brings the case to the Strasbourg Court. It is true
that the locus standi rules have been liberalized by the Lisbon
Treaty, such that individual concern is not required in relation
to a regulatory act that is of direct concern and does not entail
implementing measures." The term regulatory act appears to
cover legal acts other than legislative acts.b There are therefore
instances in which the reforms will not avail the claimant, who
will have to prove individual concern within the confines of the
Plaumann test, 7 with all the difficulties that this entails.5 It
should moreover be added that the CJEU and GC have
reaffirmed their conclusion that possession of an individual
right does not suffice to establish standing under Article 263
TFEU." There is something decidedly odd about the
infringement of an individual right not counting as a matter of
individual concern. This may be capable of being formally
reconciled with the test for individual concern, but this simply
reveals the infirmities with that test, rather than removing the
tension flowing from the fact that individual rights do not
qualify as individual concern.
If the GC and CJEU persist with this reasoning, claimants
will have a strong incentive to go to the ECtHR and argue either
54. See id. at 1018.
55. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 263 1 4.
56. See Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament and Council, Case T-18/10. [2011]
E.C.R., at 1 39-46 (delivered Sept. 6, 2011) (not yet reported); Microban Int'l Ltd v.
Commission, Case T-262/10. [2011] E.C.R., 1 21 (delivered Oct. 26, 2011) (not yet
reported).
57. See Plaurnann & Co. v. Commission, Case 25/62, [1963] E.C.R. 95.
58. See Paul Craig & Grdinne de Btrca, EU LAw: TLXT, CASES & MATERIALS Ch. 14
(5th ed, 2011).
59. See Bactria Industriehygiene-Service Verwaltungs GrnbH v. Commission, Case
C-258/02 P, [2003] E.C.R. I-15108, 1 50-59: Aicelor SA v. European Parliament and
Council, Case T-16/04, [2010] E.C.R.. 1 92-93 (delivered Mar. 2. 2010) (not yet
reported).
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that they have exhausted domestic remedies since they have
tried to use Aiticle 263, or that they do not have to do so
because they will clearly not be admitted, and hence pursuant to
Convention case law there is no need to pursue a remedy that
will not work.o They might in addition argue that the standing
rules under Article 263 are themselves in breach of Article 6
ECHR since they prevent access to justice.
It nonetheless remains paradoxical that the EU courts
should be able to use Article 3(6) of the Draft Agreement in
order to "pause" the case at Strasbourg in order for the CJEU to
adjudicate on the substance of Convention rights, where it was
the CJEU's very own restrictive standing criteria that prevented
the EU courts from doing so before the case was taken to
Strasbourg.
D. Implications of Schema for Claimants: The Problem of Delay
The discussion thus far has been concerned with the
constraints on claimant choice flowing from EU accession to the
ECHR. This included the problem of delay flowing from the fact
that a case might well have to be put on hold in order that it can
be referred to the CJEU in circumstances where it has not been
able to take a view on the alleged violation prior to the case
being heard by the ECtHR.
There is however a much more prominent issue of delay
flowing from EU accession to the ECHR, which stems from the
difficulties with the backlog of cases awaiting adjudication
before the ECtHR itself. The number of such cases currently
stands at circa 150,000, the consequence being that claimants
will wait at least a year before there is any initial examination of
the case, although the ECtHR has the power to fast track cases
deemed urgent, particularly where the claimant is in physical
danger. The reality is that cases that are not fast-tracked will
often take many years before being resolved by the ECtHR.
60. See European Court of Human Rights, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria [
44-65 (2011). http://w,.cchr.coe.int/ EC HR/EN/Header/(ase-Law/Case-law+
analysis/Admissibilit)yguide; P. VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
El ROP AN( ()NVINTION ()NHI MAN RIlHTS 16 (5 rd- Od 19981
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The problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the
number of applications made each year has doubled since
200461. Space precludes detailed examination of suggestions
made to alleviate this difficulty.62 Suffice it to say for the present
that a variety of proposals have been advanced in this respect,
including: more rapid dismissal of inadmissible cases; better
application of the ECHR principles by contracting parties in
order to reduce the incidence of the many well-founded cases
that are brought before the ECtHR; greater reliance on national
courts through increased focus on precepts such as subsidiarity
and margin of appreciation; and appointment of more judges to
the ECtHR. It is also important to note that there are real
differences of opinion as to the relative priority/significance of
these different ways of alleviating the underlying problem.
The difficulties of delay before the ECtHR are especially
significant, given that there have been concerns about the
length of time to process a case within the EU system. The
information can be readily gleaned from the Court's annual
reports.0 The number of references for a preliminary ruling
rose from 221 in 2005 to 302 in 200964. In 2011, the number of
references for a preliminary ruling submitted was, for the third
year in succession, the highest ever reached 423, which
exceeded the number in 2009 by almost 41%.6 The time taken
to secure a preliminary ruling has fallen from a high of 25
months in 2003, to just over 17 months in 2009, but there were
still 438 preliminary references pending in December 2009. In
61. See EUR. COURT OF H.R.. HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE
EL ROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BRIGHTON DECLARATION 1 16, (2012),
http:/w.cchr.coc.int/E(HR/EN/Header/Thc+(ouirt/Reforim:ofthc+(ourt/(on
ferences/.
62. See EU-R. COURT OF H.R., HIGH LEVTI CONFERENCE ON THE FUTU RE OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGAHTS, INTERLAKEN DECLARATION 1 7 (2010),
http://www.cchr.co.int/E(HR/EN/Header/'Thc+(ouirt/Refori:ofthc+(ourt/(on
ferences; FUR. COURT OF H.R., HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, IZMIR DLCLAltATION 5. 7 (2011),
http://w,.cchr.coc.int/E(HR/EN/Header/Thc+(ouirt/Reforim:ofthc+(ourt/(on
ferences.
63. See European Court of Justice, Annual Report 2011, at 10 (2011) [hercinafter
Annual Report 2011], awilable at http://curia.europa.eu/jcns/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2012-06/ra2011_activitecourcn.pdf.
64. See id.
65 Set, id,
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2011 the average time taken to deal with references for a
preliminary ruling was 16.4 months, as compared to 16 months
in 2010.
The reduction in the time to secure a preliminary ruling
was in part due to changes made to expedite the process. Thus
there is now an obligation on the ECJ to decide cases with a
minimum of delay where a person is in custody.66 There is
provision for expedited preliminary ruling hearings' 7 and for
urgent preliminary ruling procedure.68 Preliminary rulings can
be given by reasoned order where the CJEU refers to prior case
law in certain types of cases: those where the request is identical
to a point dealt with by existing case law, or where the answer
can clearly be deduced from existing cases, or where the answer
admits of no reasonable doubt.0 A case can moreover be
decided without an Opinion from the Advocate General,70 and
this power was used in approximately forty-six percent of cases
in 2011.71 The reduction in time to secure a preliminary ruling
was also in part due to the increase in the number of CJEU
judges as a result of enlargement. The net increase of 13 judges
has allowed more through-put of cases.
There are, however, reasons to question whether the recent
and welcome diminution in the time taken for preliminary
rulings can be maintained in the coming years. The benefits of
extra judges from the newer accession countries will be offset by
an increase in the number of references from those national
courts, as the lawyers in those countries become more
accustomed to the possibilities of using EU law. The impact of
the Lisbon Treaty is equally important. The fact that the Charter
of Rights is now legally binding, and that the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice is now subject to the normal Article 267
procedure, will mean a net increase in preliminary references,
66. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 267
67. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, 2012 O.J. L 265/1, art. 105-06,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcus/ upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-10/rp_cn.pdf.
68. See id. arts. 107-14.
69. See id. art. 99.
70. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 252.
71. See Annual Report 2011, supra note 63, at 11.
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more especially because many AFSJ measures are controversial
and touch on civil liberties.
The difficulty for claimants becomes readily apparent when
one aggregates the problems concerning delay attendant on the
preliminary ruling procedure with those that beset the ECHR
regime. The reality is that even if the claimant ultimately wins
justice is not going to be swift in either of the following two
scenarios.
In the first, the claimant begins an action under Article 267
TFEU which indirectly challenges an EU legal norm on rights-
based grounds. The national court does make a preliminary
reference, which we can assume for the sake of argument will be
heard within the normal time period for such rulings, which is
circa 16 months. The CJEU is able to pass judgment on the
rights-based challenge prior to the matter being heard by the
ECtHR. The claimant is not however satisfied with the CJEU's
ruling and takes the case to the ECtHR. This aspect of the claim
will then be subject to the delays attendant on the Convention
case law, with the consequence being that it may be several more
years before the substance of the case is resolved. The ECtHR
may of course choose to fast track some such cases, which will
thereby alleviate the overall time for seeking justice. However it
is questionable whether it will or indeed should do so for all
cases that emanate from the EU, since this would be unfair on
those bringing cases from other contracting states, who might
also have suffered long delays at national level before bringing
the case to the ECtHR.
In the second scenario, the claimant begins the action via
Article 267 TFEU, but the national court declines to make a
reference, since it believes that the rights-based challenge to the
EU legal norm is without foundation. The claimant might then
seek to take this matter on appeal within the national legal
system, or might proceed to the ECtHR and seek to convince it
that the EU legal norm is in violation of a Convention right. The
claimant will be subject to the normal delays of the Strasbourg
regime, coupled with the six to eight month further delay that
referral of the case by the Strasbourg Court to the CJEU is
expected to take to allow the latter to give its view on the rights-
based claim before the Strasbourg Court gives final judgment.
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III. SUBSTANCE
A. The Bosphorus Ruling post Accession
The substantive relationship between the EU and the
ECHR prior to accession will continue to be governed by
existing case law. From the perspective of the European Court of
Human Rights the leading decision on the relationship between
fundamental rights protection afforded by the EU and the
ECHR was the Bosphorus case.7 The applicant had leased two
planes from the Yugoslav Airlines, JAT, and one of these planes
was impounded in Ireland. The plane was impounded pursuant
to an EC Regulation and this Regulation had been enacted in
furtherance of United Nations ("UN") sanctions against the
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The applicant argued
that the seizure infringed its property rights under the
Convention. This issue was considered by the ECJ, which found
against the applicant, the essence of its decision being that the
Regulation implementing the UN sanctions policy was
proportionate.
The applicant then brought an action against Ireland
before the ECtHR arguing that the impounding of the plane
violated Article 1 of Protocol No 1, which protects property
rights. 4 The Strasbourg Court held that it was legitimate for
contracting parties to the ECHR to transfer power to an
international organization such as the EU, even if the
organization was not itself a contracting party under the
ECHR.7  The state contracting party however remained
72. Bosphor: us Hava Yollari Turizim Vc Ticaret Anonin Sirketi v. Ireland, Eur. Ct.
H.R. No. 45036/ 98 (2005); See Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European
Court of Human Rights Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, 6 Hum. RTs.
L. RLv. 87, 96 (2006).
73. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizn Ve Ticarct AS v. Minister for Transport,
Energy and Comnunications and othiers. Case C-84/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3953: Iris
Canor, 'Can Two 1Walk Together, Except They be Agreed?' The Relatio nship Between
International Law and European Law: The Incorporation of United Nations Sanctions against
Yugoslavia into European Corm.unity Law Through the Perspective of the European Court of
justice, 35 COMMON M\ARKET L. RLV. 137 (1998); Norcen Burrows, Caught in the Cross-
Fire, 22(2) EUR. L. RLV. 170, 171 (1997).
74. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari, Eur. CL. H.R. No. 45036/98 1 121.
75. See id. 150.
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responsible for all acts and omissions of its organs, irrespective
of whether they were the result of domestic law, or the need to
comply with an international obligation flowing from
membership of an international organization. If this were not so
then the state's obligations under the ECHR could be evaded
when power was transferred to an international organization.
State action taken in compliance with such international
obligations could nonetheless be justified as long as the relevant
international organization was considered to protect
fundamental rights "as regards both the substantive guarantees
offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a
manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for
which the Convention provides."76
The Strasbourg Court made it clear that "equivalent"
meant comparable, not identical and that the finding of
equivalence might alter if there was a relevant change in
fundamental rights' protection by the international
organization.7 Where equivalent protection was provided by the
international organization, there was a presumption that a state
had not departed from the ECHR when it did no more than
implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of that
international organization. This presumption could be rebutted
if it could be shown in the circumstances of a particular case that
the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient.
The Strasbourg Court found that the protection afforded to
fundamental rights by the EU was equivalent in the preceding
sense and that the protection afforded in the instant case was
not manifestly deficient so that the presumption was not
rebutted.79
The Strasbourg Court however also emphasized that a
"State would be fully responsible under the Convention for all
acts falling outside its strict international legal obligations",80
that numerous Convention cases had confirmed this and that
such cases concerned review by the Strasbourg Court "of the
76. Bosphorus Hava Yollari, Eur. CL. H.R. No. 45036/98 1[ 155.
77. Id. 155.
78. See id. 1 156.
79. See id. 11[ 165-66.
80. Id. 157.
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exercise of State discretion for which EC law provided."81 The
majority did not regard the Bosphorus case on its facts as raising
such an issue, since the impugned act concerned solely
compliance by Ireland with an EC obligation flowing from a
directly applicable Regulation that left no discretion to the Irish
authorities.8
Lawyers, academics, and practitioners alike are, however,
properly mindful of exceptions or qualifications to general
rules. The need for caution in this respect is exemplified by the
Bosphorus judgment. This is because it is less clear what the
Strasbourg Court meant when it said that the state would remain
fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling
outside its strict international legal obligations, and that this
enabled the Strasbourg Court to review the exercise of state
discretion for which EC law provided. The case law cited by the
ECtHR provides some guidance in this respect.
There were some cases where the review of "state discretion
for which EC law provided"" was uncontroversial in terms of
principle and entailed no real conflict or tension between the
EU and the ECHR. This included cases where the Strasbourg
Court considered whether the state had complied with Article 6
of the Convention when applying EC agricultural regulations,8 4
or whether a state that failed to implement a Directive within
the assigned time, with the consequence that it levied taxes that
it should not have done if the Directive had been properly
implemented, was thereby in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.85
There were, however, other cases that raised more
problematic issues concerning the relationship between the EU
and the ECHR. It is significant that the case singled out for
special mention"@ as being one in which the Strasbourg Court
would review the exercise of discretion for which EC law
81. Id. 1 157.
82. See id. 11[ 148, 158.
83. Id. 157.
84. See Van de Hurk v. Netherlands. App. No. 16034/90 1[ 1 (1994).
85. See S.A. Dangevilk v. France Eur. C t. H.R. No. 36677/97 1 62 (2002).
86. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari, Fur. Ct. H.R. No. 45036/98 1 157.
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provided was Cantoni, a judgment of the Grand Chamber.87 The
applicant was prosecuted for unlawfully selling pharmaceutical
products in supermarkets contrary to French law. The applicant
argued by way of defence that the products in question were not
medicinal products within the meaning of the French law and
that the definition of such products was not sufficiently clear to
satisfy the requirements of Article 7(1) of the Convention. The
French approach allowed a product to be defined as medicinal
by virtue of its function, presentation or composition. It
followed in this respect the meaning given by the ECJ to
medicinal product in the relevant Community Directive. This
Directive was primarily concerned with the authorization for
placing medicinal products on the market and the application
of the test for medicinal product was often left to national
authorities, subject to review by the ECJ. The ECJ held moreover
that in principle a Member State could reserve to pharmacists
the sale of medicinal products, since this would safeguard public
health, subject to a proportionality test designed to check
whether such a monopoly was really required for products the
use of which would not involve any serious danger to public
health.88 The Strasbourg Court concluded that the French
definition of medicinal product was not in breach of Article 7 of
the ECHR.
The judgment throws into sharp relief the relationship
between the general principle propounded by the majority in
Bosphorus with its endorsement of the principle flowing from
Cantoni. The position appeared to be that where the state was
simply applying a legal obligation pursuant to a Community
Regulation, as in Bosphorus, then the Strasbourg Court would
consider whether the EU provided equivalent protection for
fundamental rights, and if it did so it would then only intervene
if it felt that this was manifestly deficient in the instant case.
The Cantoni decision and its endorsement in Bosphorus
meant however that the Strasbourg Court would continue to
hold the state "fully responsible" for acts done "outside its strict
international legal obligations" and that this included review by
87. Cantoni v. France, Eur. CL. H.R. App. No. 17862/91 (1996).
88. See Criminal Proceedings Against Jean Monteil and Daniel Samanni, Case C-
60/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1547, 46.
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the Strasbourg Court of the "exercise of state discretion for
which EC law provided".89 The Strasbourg Court would exercise
its normal review in such cases as exemplified by Cantoni itself,
and this was clearly more extensive than review bounded by the
ideas of equivalence and manifest deficiency. There are at least
two kinds of situation in which Cantoni as interpreted in
Bosphorus could apply, both of which could give rise to problems,
especially the latter.
The first type of situation was where the Strasbourg Court
reviewed the way in which a state implemented a Directive, and
the way in which it applied the Directive to particular cases. The
assumption underlying the Cantoni judgment is that the
Strasbourg Court can and will review such matters and this
reading was reinforced by the Bosphorus judgment, which held
that Cantoni exemplified "review by this Court of the exercise of
state discretion for which EC law provided".9' There is however
potential for tension between Strasbourg and Luxembourg
because the ECJ already exercises review over such matters.
The second type of case was more problematic. It is
important to recognize that in Cantoni the Strasbourg Court was
indirectly assessing whether the definition given to a term in
Community legislation, which was then applied by a Member
State, was compatible with the ECHR. This was the actual legal
issue posed by Cantoni. It was the definition of medicinal
product adopted by the ECJ and then applied in French law that
was said by the applicant to be contrary to Article 7 ECHR. Thus
the Strasbourg Court held that the fact that the French law was
based almost word for word on the ambit of the Community
Directive did not remove it from the ambit of Article 7 of the
Convention.*1
The difficulty is apparent once it is recognized that in
Cantoni France did not have, nor was it exercising, discretion for
which EC law provided. The case was not concerned with the
way in which a state chose to implement a Community Directive.
The essence of the applicant's claim was not simply that the
89. Bosphorus Hava Yollari, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 45036/98 1 157.
90. Id. 1 157.
91. See Cantoni v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 17862/91 1 30.
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French authorities had misapplied the definition, but that the
very definition was contrary to Article 7. That was how the case
was pleaded, reasoned and decided. The salient issue was
therefore whether the meaning accorded to a certain term in a
Community Directive by the ECJ, which was then applied in
French law, was compatible with Convention rights. On this
issue the French authorities had no discretion provided by EC
law. They could not have adopted a definition of medicinal
product that differed in substance from that laid down by the
Community courts.
The precise dividing line between the limited review
provided for by Bosphorus and the fuller scrutiny exemplified by
Cantoni was unclear. The reasoning in the latter would appear to
have allowed the Strasbourg Court indirect review over the
definition of terms in a Community Directive through the
claimant's ability to argue that its application by a state was
contrary to the Convention, even where the state had no
discretion as to whether to apply that definition. If this was so
then the ' Cantoni exception' could well overshadow the
'Bosphorus rule.' It was moreover difficult in terms of logic to see
why the Cantoni reasoning should not apply to Regulations as
well as Directives. If Strasbourg was willing indirectly to engage
in fuller review as to whether the meaning of a term in a
Community Directive was compatible with the Convention, it
was unclear why it should not do so when the disputed meaning
related to a term in a Regulation. The state against whom the
action was brought had no discretion in the relevant sense in
either such instance.
It should be emphasized that Bosphorus and Cantoni
preceded the Lisbon Treaty, which contained the obligation on
the EU to accede to the ECHR, and preceded also the Accession
Agreement between the EU and the ECHR. This leads naturally
to the inquiry as to the status of the precepts established in this
case law concerning the relationship between the ECHR and the
EU so far as compliance with Convention rights is concerned.
The principled answer is as follows.
When the Accession Agreement is ratified by both sides,
there is no rationale for the EU to be given the benefit of the
"equivalence principle" as enunciated in Bosphorus. The EU
should be treated in this respect no differently than any other
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signatory state to the ECHR. This means that the ECtHR should
test the substance of EU rules for conformity with Convention
rights in the same way that it does for any other signatory. Thus
if the ECtHR feels that the meaning accorded to a term in a
Directive or Regulation is contrary to Convention rights for
reasons of the kind exemplified by Cantoni then the ECtHR
should rule accordingly. Indeed the very fact that Cantoni was
treated by the Strasbourg Court as a qualification to Bosphorus
attests to its determination, even prior to EU Accession, to
maintain some indirect control over the content of EU
legislation as applied by the Member States. This is reinforced by
the Draft Agreement which provides that an act of a Member
State of the EU, or of persons acting on its behalf, shall be
attributed to that State, even if the act occurs when the State
implements EU law, including decisions taken under the TEU
and TFEU, although this does not preclude the EU from being
responsible as a co-respondent in accord with the principles in
Article 3 of the Draft Agreement. 92
It is however entirely consistent with the preceding
proposition, indeed it is entailed by it, that the EU should
benefit from the same precepts developed by the ECtHR as any
other signatory state. Thus the fact that the equivalence
principle from Bosphorus is no longer appropriate does not
preclude the EU benefiting from ECtHR doctrines such as the
margin of appreciation if and when such a margin would be
accorded to any other signatory. It might also be contended that
when applying the margin of appreciation the ECtHR should be
properly mindful of the fact that the choices embodied in EU
legislation are the result of deliberations by 28 Member States,
who have in that sense endorsed the meaning of, or balance
between, rights contained within the EU legislation. There is, in
any event, reason to hope that tensions in this respect will be
relatively rare. The ECJ has always regarded the ECHR as an
important source of inspiration for its decisions on fundamental
rights,3 and the Charter contains an obligation that Charter
92 Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13, art. 1(4).
93. See Frcres SA v. Directeur General de la C oncurrence. de la Consommnation et
de la Repression des Fraudes and Commission, Case C-94/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9039,
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rights that correspond to rights under the ECHR should be
given the same scope and meaning.94
B. Autonomous Interpretation post Accession
As a result of the accession, the acts, measures and
omissions of the EU, like every other High Contracting
Party, will be subject to the external control exercised by the
Court in the light of the rights guaranteed under the
Convention. This is all the more important since the EU
Member States have transferred substantial powers to the
EU. At the same time, the competence of the Court to assess
the conformity of EU law with the provisions of the
Convention will not prejudice the principle of the
autonomous interpretation of the EU law."
This paragraph is finely balanced. The statement of
principle at the outset is clear and forceful, viz that the EU will,
as a result of accession, be treated in the same way as other
contracting parties, more especially because EU Member States,
who are also party to the ECHR, have transferred substantial
powers to the EU. This is then balanced by the assurance that
the ECtHR's testing of EU law for conformity with the ECHR
will not prejudice the principle of the autonomous
interpretation of EU law. It is nonetheless important to
determine how far this delicate balance is sustainable. In
addressing this issue it is important for the sake of conceptual
clarity to disaggregate three different senses of the autonomy of
EU law.
1. An Autonomous Legal Order
The concept of an autonomous legal order may connote
the idea of a separate legal system, with its own rule of
recognition. Such a system has its own primary and secondary
legal norms produced by an admixture of legislature and courts.
It has relationships de jure and de facto with other legal orders,
1 29: Liniburgsc Vinyl Maatschappij (LVM) v. Commission, Joined Cases C-238, 244,
245. 247, 250-252. 254/99 P. [2002] E.C.R. I-8618, 1 273-75.
94. See Charter of Rights, supra note 2, art. 52(3). 2010 OJ. C 83, at 21.
95. Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 13, Appendix V 1 5.
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even if, as exemplified by the issue of the supremacy of EU law,
the precise nature of the relationship remains contested to some
degree at least.
EU accession to the ECHR does not in reality jeopardize
the autonomy of EU law in this first sense. The mere fact that a
legal order chooses to become party to an international treaty
that entails some subjection to the norms applied therein does
not thereby entail the conclusion that the legal order ceases to
be autonomous. If this were indeed so then no legal order
would be autonomous. All national legal orders are party, albeit
to varying degrees, to different international treaty obligations,
including the many countries that are party to the ECHR.
Participation in such regimes does not thereby undermine the
features that constitute a separate legal system, although it does
of course qualify the freedom of action for any such polity,
which will, given basic precepts of pacta sunt servanda, have to
ensure that international obligations are adhered to.
2. A Distinctive Legal Order
The concept of autonomy can also be used to connote the
idea that a particular legal order has features that are regarded
as, or may be regarded as, distinctive from other legal orders,
with the consequence that it should be interpreted differently in
certain respects.
This was indeed the argument in the famous V an Gend en
Loos decision.9 The ECJ was asked whether Aiticle 12 EEC could
give rise to individual rights, which could be invoked before
national courts to challenge national action, which was said to
be in breach of EEC law. The Member States argued, inter alia,
that the EEC Treaty was no different from a standard
international Treaty, and that the concept of direct effect would
contradict the intentions of those who had created the Treaty.
Thus on this view, international treaties did not normally create
rights for individuals that they could enforce in national courts,
and hence the EEC Treaty should not be interpreted in this
manner.
96. See van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandsc Adminitiatic der Belastingen, Case
26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12.
36] 1143
1144 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL[Vol. 2013:1114
The ECJ's response was in essence to distance the EEC
Treaty from other international treaties and thereby justify the
conclusion that the former could in principle have direct effect,
even if this was a rarity in international treaties more generally.
Its reasoning was therefore directed towards showing that the
EEC Treaty had distinctive features as judged by its spirit,
general scheme and wording. The ECJ pointed to the fact that
the EEC Treaty was designed to establish a common market,
which was of direct concern to interested parties, and that this
carried the implication that the Treaty was more than an
agreement creating mutual obligations between the contracting
states. This view was, said the ECJ, confirmed by the preamble,
which referred not only to governments but to peoples; by the
establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the
exercise of which affected Member States and their citizens; by
bodies such as the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee, in which Member State nationals came
together and cooperated; and by Article 177 EEC, which was
said to show that Member States acknowledged that nationals
could rely on EEC law before national courts.
It was from these foundations that the ECJ drew the
conclusion that the Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also
their nationals. Thus the message was that even if direct effect
was a rarity in international treaty law, it was warranted in the
EEC, because it constituted a new legal order, as judged by its
spirit, general scheme and wording. The ECJ's reasoning was
sound insofar as there was foundation in the Treaty for the
conclusion reached, and also circular, in the sense that the
degree to which the EEC Treaty could be regarded as a 'new'
legal order depended in part at least on whether it could have
direct effect, which was the very question in issue.
There is, in any event, no reason why EU accession to the
ECHR should undermine the claim that the EU Treaty is
autonomous in the sense of distinctive, as interpreted in the
preceding sense. Commentators may continue to disagree on
the extent to which the EU Treaty is distinct, but membership of
the ECHR does not markedly affect such debate, since the claim
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for novelty or distinction never rested on the idea that the EU
was immune from external obligations.
3. Autonomous Interpretation of EU Law
The language from the quotation adumbrated above is
framed in terms of Strasbourg oversight of EU law not
prejudicing the autonomous interpretation of EU law. The
reality is however that notwithstanding the diplomatically
framed quotation this conception of autonomy is affected by ELU
accession to the ECHR.
Prior to accession the ECJ exercised what has been
appropriately termed a "hermeneutic monopoly" 7 over the
interpretation of EU law. It had both a jurisdictional and a
substantive connotation. In jurisdictional terms, it captured the
idea that the ECJ would be the ultimate repository of meaning
of EU law, this jurisdiction deriving from Article 19 TEU, which
charges what is now the Court ofJustice of the European Union,
CJEU, with the task of ensuring that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed. In substantive
terms, it connoted the idea that the meaning accorded to EU
concepts would be autonomous, in the sense that it would not
be tied to that of analogous terms in national law, but would be
the meaning felt by the ECJ to fit best with the wording and aims
of the Treaty.9" The ECJ might well take cognizance of national
law, or indeed the ECHR, in reaching its conclusion, but this did
not alter the fact that it made the substantive determination.
Both aspects of the hermeneutic monopoly are affected by
EU accession to the ECHR. The jurisdictional dimension is
modified because the EU will in reality no longer be the
ultimate repository of meaning concerning fundamental rights
and EU law, at least insofar as those rights are covered by the
ECHR. This is indeed recognized from within EU law by Article
97. See generally Federico Mancini, The Free Movement of Workers in the Case-Law of
the European Court of Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAw 67 (Deirdre Curtin & David O'Keeffe eds., 1992).
98. See. e.g., Hoekstra v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en
Ambachten, Case 75/63. [1964] E.C.R. 177. 184; Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, Case
152/73. [1974] E.C.R. 153. 156-57: Conmission v. Luxembourg, Case C-473/93,
[19961 E.C.R. I-3255, 1 26-27.
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52(3) of the EU Charter of Rights, which provides that in so far
as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights
shall be the same as those laid down by ECHR, subject to the
proviso that this does not prevent EU law providing more
extensive protection." The substantive dimension of the
hermeneutic monopoly is also modified, since the meaning of
Convention rights will be ultimately determined by the ECtHR,
as will the balance between such rights and pursuit of other
goals mediated through a proportionality test. The ECtHR will
be sensitive to the imperatives of the EU, and will not lightly
conclude that the interpretation accorded by the EU courts to
Convention rights was mistaken. This does not alter the fact
that, as made patently clear by the preceding quotation, the
ECtHR will exercise external control over EU acts to ensure that
they comply with the Convention, in the same way as for any
other contracting party.
C. Convention and Charter post Accession
It is axiomatic that post accession the ECHR will only bind
the EU in relation to the rights contained in the former
document. This is a trite proposition, but it nonetheless has a
number of ramifications that are less self-evident.
1. Multiple Rights-Based Claims
Legal issues arising from real-world cases do not fit into
neat, hermetically-sealed compartments. It is not uncommon for
such cases to feature multiple rights-based claims. This is not
problematic in terms of principle. It may however give rise to
difficulties, where the claim invokes certain rights that are
protected by the ECHR and the EU Charter, and other rights
that are protected only by the EU Charter. The ECtHR will, post
accession, have the final say as to the meaning of Convention
rights that are also contained in the Charter, while the CJEU
remains authoritative in relation to rights that go beyond those
99. See Charter of Rights art. 52(3), 2010 O.J. C 83/389.
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in the ECHR. The difficulties are both procedural and
substantive.
The procedural difficulties flow from the fact that the
claimant may seek to have the meaning of Convention rights
contested before the ECtHR. Thus in the simple scenario where
the case begins in the national court, and is referred to the
CJEU under Article 267 TFEU, the case will be finally resolved in
relation to rights-based claims found only in the Charter and not
in the ECHR when the CJEU has pronounced on those issues
and sent its ruling to the national court. The national court will
however not be able to resolve the case fully until the ECtHR has
decided whether the CJEU's interpretation of Charter rights
that are equivalent to those in the ECHR was correct, with the
attendant problems of delay charted above.
The substantive difficulties flow from the fact that there
may be some overlap between the two species of right in the
same case, with the consequence that interpretation by the
CJEU of a Charter right that corresponds to a Convention right
will be affected by its interpretation of a Charter right that is not
contained in the ECHR and which is pleaded in the same case.
This might occur in a variety of ways. The claimant may
contend, for example, that the two rights must be balanced
because they are tension, or that the Charter right that is not a
Convention right should be interpreted in a particular way in
order that it can have a meaning distinct from a related
Convention right that is contained in the Charter.
2. Charter Rights that "Correspond" to Convention Rights
The ECtHR has the ultimate interpretive authority over
Convention rights. It should however be remembered that, even
prior to accession, Article 52(3) of the EU Charter imposes an
obligation on the EU to ensure that Charter rights that
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR shall have the
same scope and meaning as those in the ECHR, subject to the
caveat that Union law can provide more extensive protection.0oo
Article 52(3) therefore requires the identification of those
rights which "correspond" to those guaranteed by the ECHR.
] 0W S d
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The task is facilitated by guidance from the drafting process, and
was addressed by the Explanatory Memorandum. It concluded
that the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition
on slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security,
respect for private and family life, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, freedom of expression and
information, freedom of assembly and association, right to
property, protection in the event of removal, expulsion or
extradition, and the presumption of innocence and right of
defence, had the same meaning and scope as the corresponding
Articles of the ECHR.10
There are, however, Charter articles where the relationship
with ECHR rights is more complexo2 albeit for different
reasons. Some Charter rights, such as Article 5 dealing with
slavery and forced labour, are based on an ECHR right in part,
but go beyond it, by expressly prohibiting trafficking in human
beings. Other rights, such as Article 8 dealing with personal
data, are based on more than one source, in this instance a
Treaty article plus directive, as well as an ECHR right. Yet other
Charter rights modify the analogous ECHR right. This is
exemplified by Article 9, which countenances the possibility of
marriage by those of the same sex, where this is permitted by the
relevant national law. There are also instances where the
Charter article is based on more than one source, and modifies
the relevant ECHR right. This is so for the right to education,
and for the important right to equality. This complexity is
recognized by the Explanatory Memorandum, which lists
Charter articles where the meaning is the "same" as the
corresponding ECHR right, but the scope is wider.
3. Same Meaning and Scope
The other major injunction in Article 52(3) is that the
"meaning and scope" of Charter rights that correspond to
ECHR rights should be the same as those laid down in the
101. See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. C
303/17.
102. See id. at 18.
103. IL arts 9. 12(11. 14(1). 14(t)3 47. 50
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ECHR.104 Earlier versions of the Charter were crucially different
in this respect, requiring only that the meaning and scope of
such Charter rights were "similar" to the corresponding ECHR
right.1os This would have given rise to significant problems of
interpretation. HWhile the present formulation does not refer
expressly to the case law of the Strasbourg court this must be
implicit in the injunction that the meaning and scope of Charter
rights corresponding to rights contained in the ECHR should be
the same. This view is supported by the Explanatory
Memorandum, o and by the CJEU. 117
It should however be recognized that the present formula,
requiring the interpretation of corresponding rights to be the
same, may still be problematic. This will especially be so in areas
where the ECHR jurisprudence on the point is unclear, or
where the point is a novel one. The CJEU will then have to face
the issue that has been addressed by national courts of states
that are contracting parties to the ECHR, which is the extent to
which they should press beyond the current boundaries of
ECHR law and thereby play a role in the evolution of Charter
rights.
It is clear that the ECtHR regards the Convention as a living
instrument, and that the meaning of the rights therein evolve
over time. 108 It has moreover been convincingly argued that
evolutionary interpretation is common within public
international law.1 1o9 The CJEU's interpretive freedom is
104. J. McB. v. LE., Case C-400/10 PPU. [2010] E.C.R. 1-8965, 1 53.
105. See Explanations Relating to the Provisions of the Draft Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 Charter 4423/00. Convent 46, at 36.
106. See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note
101, art. 2, at 17.
107. Schecke GbR & Eifert v. Land Hessen, Cases C-92-93/09. [2010] E.C.R. I-
11117, at 51-52; DEB Deutsche Energichandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-279/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1-13852, at 35.
108. Goodwin v. Unitcd Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 1 74 (July 11, 2002),
http://hudoc.chir.coc.int/sitcs/cng/pages/cearch.aspx?i=001-60596: Stafford V.
United Kingdom, App. No. 46295/99, 1 68 (May 28, 2002),
http: //hudoc.cchr.coc.int /sitcs/eng/pages/scarch.aspx?i=001-22163: Opinion of
Advocate General Trstenjak, . S. v. Secretay of State for the Home Department Case C-
411/10, [2011 ] E.C.R. I, 1 145 (delivered Sept. 22, 2011) (judgment not yet
reported).
109. Eirik Bjorge, EVOLUTIONARY INTLRPRETATION OF TREATIES (forthcoming
2014).
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enhanced in this respect by the very fact that Ar ticle 52(3) of the
Charter makes express provision for EU protection of rights to
be greater than that provided by the ECtHR.110 The CJEU
should in addition be willing to interpret Convention rights in
accord with their spirit and apply them to situations that have
not yet been addressed by the ECtHR, thereby participating in
the process whereby Convention rights evolve over time.
CON\CLUSION
Discussion concerning EU accession to the ECHR is, as
stated earlier, as old as the EEC itself. The Lisbon Treaty
provided the formal catalyst for change by imposing an
obligation on the EU to accede. The obligation had no formal
time line, but the EU began the accession process shortly after
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, treating the issue of rights-
protection as part of the broader Stockholm programme, which
set out the political priorities for the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice for five years.111 There will be challenges, both
procedural and substantive, flowing from accession, but they will
be resolved, even if the precise manner in which this occurs may
not always be easy to predict. Accession will signal a new chapter
in the protection of rights in the EU and a new dimension to
inter-institutional judicial relationships.
110. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Proceedings Relating to the Execution
of European Arrest Warrants Issued Against Ciprian Vasile Radu C ase C-396/11, [2012]
E.C.R. I , [ 80 (delivered Oct. 18, 2012),
111. The Stockholm Programme-An Open and Secure Europe Serving and
Protecting the Citizen, Brussels, 25 Nov. 2009, Council 16484/1/09 at 3:
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's Citizens, Action Plan
Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM (2010) 171 Final (Apr. 2010), § 1.
